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Abstract ‒ Agents’ judgment depends on perception and previous 
knowledge. Assuming that previous knowledge depends on 
perception, we can say that judgment depends on perception. So, if 
judgment depends on perception, can agents judge that they have the 
same perception? In few words, this is the addressed paradox through 
this document. While illustrating on the paradox, it’s found that to 
reach agreement in communication, it’s not necessary for parties to 
have the same perception however the necessity is to have perception 
correspondence. The attempted solution to this paradox reveals a 
potential uncertainty in judging the matter thus supporting the 
skeptical view of the problem. Moreover, relating perception to 
intelligence, the same uncertainty is inherited by judging the level of 
intelligence of an agent compared to others not necessarily from the 
same kind (e.g. machine intelligence compared to human intelligence). 
Using a proposed simple mathematical model for perception and 
action, a tool is developed to construct scenarios, and the problem is 
addressed mathematically such that conclusions are drawn 
systematically based on mathematically defined properties. When it 
comes to formalization, philosophical arguments and views become 
more visible and explicit. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Perception is the process of feeling and understanding the 
environment by ways of sensory data processing. These 
sensory data are the results of interactions between sensors and 
outer stimuli [1]. Hence, it could be said that perception is the 
process of translating the outside world to an inside 
representation into the perceiver. This directly brings up to 
mind the other way translation: The translation from the inside 
representation into the outside world. This is what is called 
behavior or action. The term “agent” is used to denote an entity 
that has these translation capabilities, an entity that is able to 
perceive and act. 
Being the only port to the world, perception has been a 
source of problems and engrossment to philosophers [2] [3]. 
The problem addressed in this document is not concerned with 
the quality of the perception process (whether there is illusion, 
hallucination, insensitivity to simulus changes, or the perciever 
is not capable of sensing some stimulus ranges, …). The 
problem is about the possibility of judging the relation between 
the received percepts of two agents for the same stimulus in 
terms of similarity. 
Although this problem has been addressed before such that 
many scenarios have been composed and used in philosiphcal 
arguments [4] [5], the problem here is addressed differently. 
Using a proposed simple mathematical model for perception 
and action, a tool is developed to construct scenarios, and the 
problem is addressed mathematically such that conclusions are 
drawn systematically based on mathematically defined 
properties. When it comes to formalization, philosophical 
arguments and views become more visible and explicit. 
II. A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF PERCEPTION-ACTION 
Consider an agent,  , that generates a stimulus,  , of type   
with a function    ( )    where   is a parameter that the 
value of the stimulus,  , depends on. For example, when agent, 
 , says “Hello”, it generates a sound wave corresponding to 
that “Hello”. So, we will call the generated sound wave a 
stimulus,  , that corresponds to the word “Hello” which we will 
call a parameter giving it the symbol  . The mapping from   to 
the mathematical representation of the stimulus ( ) is the 
function    , that function generates a stimulus of type  , 
which is sound, that corresponds to a parameter or a meaning 
 , here          . Figure 1-(a) shows this case. 
Also, that agent,  , understands a meaning,  , by sensing a 
stimulus,  , of type   with a function    
  ( )    such that   
is the received stimulus by the agent from the surrounding 
world. For example, the agent receives the previously 
generated sound wave. Then, it finds its meaning by applying 
the function    
  
 on that stimulus (sound wave) to find out 
that    
  (         (       ))         . So, it simply 
hears “Hello”. Figure 1-(b) shows this case. 
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Figure 1 – (a) is  an agent understands a meaning “Hello” and 
expresses it by generating the sound wave of “Hello” while (b) hears 
the sound wave of “Hello” and understands as “Hello” 
Figure 2 shows the graphical symbolic representation of an 
agent with the previously mentioned functions. 
 
Figure 2 – A graphical symbolic representation of an agent that can 
generate and perceive a stimulus of type S 
The line 
      ( ) 
means that: agent   generates a stimulus corresponding to the 
meaning  . In the previous example, to indicate that   said 
“Hello”, we can write 
 
           ;   understands the meaning “Hello” 
      (       )  ;   expresses the meaning of “Hello” by saying 
“Hello” 
On the other hand, the line 
      
  ( ) 
means that: agent   understands the meaning of the received 
stimulus,  , as    
  ( ) which equals  . In the previous 
example, to say that   hears the previously generated sound of 
“Hello” and understands it as “Hello”, we can write 
 
      
  (     (       )) ;   hears the sound of “Hello” 
      
      (       )  ;   hears the sound of “Hello” 
           ;   understands the meaning “Hello” 
Agent   is surrounded by a world  . We can assume 
without loss of generality that the world carries the generated 
stimulus without any modification. 
 
 
III. THE PERCEPTION LIE PARADOX 
Now, suppose that there are two agents,   and  , that can 
generate and percept sound, having the following dialog.   
understands a meaning and expresses it by sound. Then,   
hears the sound and understands it. After that,   re-sounds it 
back to   so as to make sure that   understands the required 
meaning. The following is the dialog between them.
 
Figure 3 – A dialog between two agents: A and B 
            ;   understands the meaning         
     (       )  ;   says         
     (       )  ; the world   carries the sound of 
        
     
     (       )  ;   hears itself and understands that 
  (       ) is the sound of         
            ;   understands the meaning         
      
     (       )  ;   hears   (       ) and understands 
the meaning   
     (       ) 
        
     (       )  ;   expresses the meaning 
  
     (       ) by saying 
  
     (       ) with its sound 
     
     (       ) 
     (       ) ;   tries to generate the same sound it 
heard before,   (       ), so    and 
  
   cancel each other  
     (       )  ;   carries the sound generated by 
agent  ,   (       ) 
     
     (       )  ;   hears   (       ) and figures out 
that it is equivalent or like its sound  
            ;   understands the sound   (       ) 
is the sound of        , so   
understands the meaning         
The following table summarizes what both agents have 
understood: 
Agent   Agent   
            
     (       )    
It could be noticed that agent   understands a different 
meaning than what agent   understands, however agent   
succeeded to make agent   understand what matches  ’s 
thoughts or way of thinking! That is a confusing result; both 
agents think that they understand the same meaning although 
they may not (or do not)! 
Agent   thinks that agent   understands the meaning of the 
sound as   (the same way   understands it). On the other hand, 
A 
𝑓𝑆 𝐴 
𝑓𝑆 𝐴
   
A 
𝑆𝐴 
𝑆𝐴
   
B 
𝑆𝐵 
𝑆𝐵
   
  thinks that   understands the meaning of the sound as   (the 
same way   understands it). They both think that they 
understand meanings the same way. They both think that they 
have the same perception of the surrounding world so they 
think that that’s why they can understand each other. However, 
we can see that they both have different perception as well as 
they can understand each other well. For both agents to have 
the same perception,   
   should be equal to   
  . The 
question is: Can they (either   or  ) tell that   
     
  ? 
Ag nts’ judgm nt d p nds on perception and previous 
knowledge. Assuming that previous knowledge depends on 
perception, we can say that judgment depends on perception 
without the need to mention previous knowledge. So, if 
judgment depends on perception, can agents judge that they 
have the same perception? Can agents be sure that their 
judgment about perception is not deviated by their perception? 
Consider agents that can interact with five different stimuli: 
sound ( ), light ( ), touch ( ), taste ( ), smell ( ). Can they 
tell that all  ’s are equivalent (  
     
     
     
   
 ), all  ’s are equivalent, all  ’s are equivalent, all  ’s are 
equivalent, and all  ’s are equivalent? Can they tell that they 
have the same perception of the world in a way that is not 
affected by their perception? 
So, th  qu sti n is NOT “D  humans hav  th  sam  
p rc pti n?” but th  qu sti n is “Can humans judg  that th y 
hav  th  sam  p rc pti n?” 
Being agnostic about this question imposes the 50% 
probability that we, humans, might have different perception of 
the world around us. It is somehow shocking to think so! One 
might see that tomatoes, that you know, are red, the red you 
know, while another might see them blue, the same as your 
blue, but they cannot figure out that they are perceiving these 
different meanings. The one that knows that tomatoes are red 
says to the other one “Tomatoes are red”. Then, the other one 
that knows that tomatoes are blue hears the one with red 
tomatoes as if saying “Tomatoes are blue” so he knows that he 
is talking right. So, the one with the blue tomatoes says to the 
other one “You are right; tomatoes are blue”. Then comes the 
turn of the one with red tomatoes to hear “blue” as if hearing 
“red” and life continues. 
Having different perception of the world, means that there 
are different worlds! As long as we interpret stimuli differently, 
we live in different worlds! In my world, I might interpret 
someone’s actions towards me as if being nice so I act nicely 
while he thinks, in his own world, that he is being rude and I 
am coping up with him by being rude although I’m being nice 
in my world, and life still continues! You might describe for 
me the shape of a circle while I understand your description as 
a description for a square and when I re-describe the 
description I understood as a square’s description you 
understand it as a circle’s description! So you think I’ve 
understood your meaning and, fortunately, life keeps running! 
In my world, I might see people with three legs and 
walking upside down but in your world people might have ten 
legs and no arms. However, we can still communicate without 
noticing any difference or anything weird in the other’s world. 
It might be true that Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg, Einstein, 
Newton and others are those men who had revealed the 
mystery of your physical world and Muhammad, Jesus, Moses 
and others are those men who had revealed the mystery of your 
metaphysical world. 
Those sentences might look very weird and so might be the 
concept of, literally, completely different perceptions which 
leads to, literally, completely different realities. This is 
different than saying that: “Real” has different interpretations 
to some extent. As in the later, if two humans are in that case, 
they are there because each one did not see/sense what the 
other had seen/sensed. However, when one is moved to the 
other’s place and senses the same experience as of the other’s, 
the moved one will conclude a nearer interpretation to his 
opponent, if not the same, and will be understanding the two 
different interpretations. Or both of them could continue 
arguing each other and still it’s possible for them to reach a 
common understanding. In some point of time, they will catch 
the difference. 
This is not the case on the other hand. Both are conceived 
that they understand the same thing the same way, which is not 
the truth, and they have no mean to feel the complete 
difference. 
IV. PERCEPTION CORRESPONDENCE 
It could be concluded that, an agreement about the 
understanding of a concept could be reached in 
communication, regardless from the similarity of the forms of 
understanding of that concept among communication parties, 
as long as (i) the communicated stimuli are the same among 
communication parties and (ii) those stimuli are always 
triggered by the same form of understanding and always 
trigger the same form per communication party. 
Mathematically, this means that for all stimuli, there has to 
be one-to-one correspondence from the form of understanding 
of one agent to the other. So, for agents   and   to reach an 
agreement about a concept, it is not necessary that their forms 
of understanding to be the same (  
     
  ) however the 
necessity is to have a one-to-one correspondence function: 
    
     
   (i.e.  (  
  )    
  ) 
So, if it is possible to find such a function, it could be 
judged that   and   can reach agreement or they have 
perception correspondence. 
Relating perception to intelligence [6] [7], the fact that two 
agents have perception correspondence contributes to the 
judgment whether or not they are on the same level of 
intelligence. If agents   and   understand things in the same 
way or more generally in a one-to-one correspondence manner, 
then most probably they do have the same level of intelligence. 
V. A SOLUTION ATTEMPT TO THE PARADOX 
There might be a scenario that tells whether   
     
   or 
not. Increasing complexity of dialogs by adding more agents 
with more sensors and actuators won’t help as long as the 
couple of a perception function and its inverse cancel each 
other. However, assumptions that might help could be like 
making the surrounding world convert one stimulus of any type 
to another of any other type (we can watch the effect of sound 
on dust) or give that ability to agents. 
Imagine that we have a special kind of agent. An agent that 
has a special perception function that can percept other agents’ 
percepts. A thinkable scenario is that, the special agent to 
observe two normal agents perceiving the same stimulus. Then 
he can conclude whether the observed percepts of both agents 
are similar or not. 
Let’s call the special agent a “Judge”,  , and the special 
perception function of the judge “Observation”,   . This 
scenario is illustrated by Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 – The judge agent observing percepts of normal agents 
 
The possible observations of the judge are: 
1.  [  
  ( )]       
  ( ) . In that case, the judge can 
conclude that   
  ( )    
  ( ) 
2.  [  
  ( )]       
  ( ) . In that case, there are two 
conclusions: 
a. Either,   
  ( )    
  ( ) 
b. Or,    is not one-to-one function which means that for 
some values of  ,   
  ( )    
  ( ) and for other 
values of  ,   
  ( )    
  ( ) 
In conclusion, even that conceptual judge can only be sure 
that agents have different perception and cannot be sure that 
agents have the same perception. In other words, if this judge 
is asked whether agents have the same perception or not, he 
can say “N ” with a c mp  t  c rtainty of 100% but cannot 
say “Y s” with such c rtainty. 
VI. CERTAINTY ABOUT PERCEPTION CORRESPONDENCE 
Besides judging whether both agents have the same 
perception or not, this conceptual judge might make further 
judgment about the perception correspondence between both 
agents. Looking again at the possible observations of the judge: 
1.  [  
  ( )]       
  ( )  and the judge concludes that 
  
  ( )    
  ( ). In that case: 
a. If it is possible for the judge to find the perception 
correspondence function  
          
  ( )    [  
  ( )] (i.e. 
    (     
  ( ) )    [  
  ( )]), then the judge can 
conclude that   and   can reach agreement, they have 
perception correspondence, or they might be at the same 
level of intelligence. 
b. Or, if it is not possible for the judge to find such 
function, then he can conclude the converse. 
2.  [  
  ( )]       
  ( )  and either   
  ( )    
  ( ) 
or   
  ( )    
  ( ) could be true. In that case, the 
correspondence function is easily found as 
    (     
  ( ) )    [  
  ( )]    [  
  ( )] 
however   might be falsely judging that   and   can reach 
agreement, they have perception correspondence, or they 
might be at the same level of intelligence. 
Another conclusion is that, the degree of certainty of the 
conceptual judge judgment about whether agents have 
perception correspondence or not (might be at the same level 
of intelligence or not) is inherited from the certainty of that 
conceptual judge judgment about whether the same agents 
have the same perception or not. 
A 𝑆𝐴
  (𝑠) B 𝑆𝐵
  (𝑠) 𝑠 
J 
𝑂𝐽 𝑆𝐴
  (𝑠)  𝑂𝐽 𝑆𝐵
  (𝑠)  
VII. CERTAINTY ABOUT WIDE PERCEPTION 
CORRESPONDENCE 
Introducing a new agent,  , from different type than of   
and   (  is an intelligent machine),   will have a different 
observation function for that kind,    . Let’s consider the 
scenario illustrated in Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5 – The judge agent observing percepts of normal agents A and B 
and an intelligent machine M 
If it is possible for the judge to find the following 
correspondence functions: 
    (      
  ( ) )    [  
  ( )] 
    (      
  ( ) )    [  
  ( )] 
1. Either the judge can conclude that   has a wide/general 
perception correspondence (or a wide/general intelligence) 
if   [  
  ( )]       
  ( ) . 
2. Or the judge can falsely conclude that   has a wide 
perception correspondence (or a wide/general intelligence) 
if   [  
  ( )]       
  ( ) . 
As a conclusion, the degree of certainty about whether an 
agent (e.g. an intelligent machine) has a wide/general 
perception correspondence (wide/general intelligence) or not 
compared to some kind of agents is inherited from the certainty 
about whether these agents have the same perception or not. 
So, solving the perception paradox gives useful hints about 
the intelligence of an agent compared to others not necessarily 
from the same kind. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Perception has been a source of problems and engrossment 
to philosophers. Many philosophical problems had been raised 
and many views had been proposed. The proved uncertainty 
about judging perception similarity among agents supports the 
philosophical skeptical view of the world and highlights one 
limitation of the human mind. This uncertainty is automatically 
extended to everything related in some way or dependent on 
perception. Also, the mathematical formulation of the problem 
gives clear and explicit explanation and provides access to 
direct and systematic conclusions. 
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